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In its 2009 fiscal year, the United States will experi-
ence a federal budget deficit that could reach 12 per-
cent of GDP or more,1 an event unprecedented since
the end of World War II.At the same time,long-term
fiscal imbalances loom ever larger,as the ongoing de-
mographic shift raises the old-age dependency ratio
and medical expenditures continue to rise rapidly.
Much of this year’s deficit is attributable to the very
severe recession, as a consequence of both automat-
ic stabilizers and countercyclical discretionary fiscal
policy actions already taken. But the US fiscal posi-
tion had deteriorated even before the onset of reces-
sion at the end of 2007, as the federal budget sur-
pluses of a decade ago gave way to substantial deficits
that reached around 3.5 percent of GDP during the
healthy fiscal years of 2003 and 2004.
What role have US budget rules played in this evo-
lution of the fiscal picture, and what lies in store for
the United States, as a new president and Congress
confront the simultaneous challenges of recession
and fiscal misalignment? A review of the experience
of the United States under different budget regimes,
and of the evolution of the regimes themselves, pro-
vides some clues as to how the situation may unfold.
Budget rules in the United States
Like the European Union under the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP), the United States has imposed
fiscal rules in attempting to impose a degree of fiscal
discipline on the political process of budget determi-
nation.But,in large part because of the differences in
federal structure, the set-up in the United States dif-
fers from that in Europe. US budget rules are much
more inflexible at lower levels of government than at
the national level. Relatively tight rules apply in vir-
tually all US states, where some sort of annual bal-
anced budget requirement applies to current expen-
ditures and incipient deficits must be dealt with ei-
ther within the fiscal year or soon thereafter. These
strong budget restrictions have induced strong state
fiscal response to budget shocks.2 Note that these
state budget procedures are not imposed on the states
by the US constitution or by other legislative man-
dates at the national level. Rather, they have been
adopted individually by the states themselves and
survived in the US political and economic environ-
ment that features substantial cross-state mobility
and no explicit mechanism for policy co-ordination
among the states.Thus,even though the state and lo-
cal share of overall government activity has been ris-
ing over time in the United States,countercyclical fis-
cal policy remains within the purview of the federal
government.
At the US federal level, there are no overriding pro-
visions such as those of the SGP governing annual
debt and deficits.Attempts over the years,particular-
ly in the 1970s and 1980s, to pass a balanced-budget
constitutional amendment never succeeded.Instead,
the federal government has operated under a series
of budget control regimes, typically featuring many
components. Some components are of no apparent
consequence, such as the federal debt limit (which
must be raised when the government increases the
amount of outstanding debt).Other components,dis-
cussed further below,may well have influenced fiscal
policy choices.But none of the components have con-
stitutional standing; they can easily be modified by
the same government that is subject to them,and this
is a main source of skepticism about their potential
impact.US federal budget rules are also complex,ow-
ing to the separation of powers between the President
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and procedures within Congress between the House
of Representatives and the Senate.Thus, some space
is necessary to characterize the key elements of the
different budget regimes before discussing evidence
of their possible effects.
Federal budget regimes
In 1974 Congress passed the Congressional Budget
Act (CBA),introducing the first significant restraints
on the US federal budget process. The CBA estab-
lished a Budget Committee in each house of
Congress and created the CBO to provide budget
projections needed to implement the legislation.
Under the CBA, both houses of Congress passed a
resolution laying out limits on revenues and spending
for the coming year, and subsequent legislation was
supposed to adhere to these limits.The CBA provid-
ed a co-ordination mechanism for Congressional
budget actions, and also introduced the practice of
providing multi-year budget projections to Congress,
a practice that eventually would play a role in the for-
mulation of budget rules.However,the CBA did not
restrict the size of government or the ability of gov-
ernment to increase spending or cut taxes.Indeed,by
the 1980s,the United States was experiencing histor-
ically large (as of the time) peacetime budget deficits,
with the deficit hitting 6 percent of GDP in 1983.
Concern about budget deficits led in late 1985 to the
passage of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH)
bill,for the first time laying out specific deficit targets,
which followed a declining path until a target of zero
was called for in fiscal year 1991. The legislation re-
quired that the budget the President submitted each
year be consistent with that year’s deficit target and
that Congress pass legislation in accord with the
deficit target.If legislated policy was projected to miss
the deficit target, then an automatic “sequestration”
process would ensue,cutting the budget according to
a specified allocation rule in order to meet the deficit
target. The sequestration procedures were modified
in 1987 after the first version of GRH was found un-
constitutional by the Supreme Court.The 1987 legis-
lation also relaxed the target deficit reduction path to
one in which a zero deficit was to be achieved in 1993,
rather than in 1991.
The idea behind the sequestration process was that it
would represent so negative an outcome that the
threat of its application would force Congress to
come to an agreement on legislation satisfying the
deficit targets.In principle,sequestration was intend-
ed to have an important impact without ever actual-
ly being implemented, and the sequestration process
never was initiated during the GRH period. How-
ever,as the revision of the trajectory of deficit targets
in 1987 indicated, this approach to deficit control
lacked an effective political mechanism for produc-
ing the desired results when the gap that needed to
be closed was too big. Also, unlike the SGP, which
provides some flexibility to accommodate the need
to respond to economic downturns, GRH specified
unconditional nominal deficit targets. So, as a reces-
sion began in the summer of 1990 and the tax system’s
automatic stabilizers caused revenue to decline, the
difficulty of meeting GRH’s ever-shrinking deficit
targets forced a change in regime. In the fall of that
year, a protracted “budget summit” meeting of
President George H.W.Bush and leaders of Congress
generated two important results: (1) a package of
spending reductions and tax increases;and (2) the re-
placement of GRH with the Budget Enforcement Act
(BEA), ushering in a new budget regime that was
thought to overcome some of the problems of GRH.
The BEA eliminated annual deficit targets and insti-
tuted targets for discretionary spending, a category
that excludes spending for health care,Social Security
(public retirement and disability pensions), unem-
ployment insurance and other “entitlement” pro-
grams. For the budget as a whole, BEA specified
“pay-as-you-go” (PAYGO) restrictions on taxes and
entitlement spending (other than Social Security),re-
quiring that legislation on such items does not in-
crease the deficit,in the aggregate.Except for discre-
tionary spending, therefore, the budget rule now ap-
plied to legislated changes in policy,rather than to ac-
tual levels of spending or revenue. Changes in taxes
or entitlement spending that resulted from econom-
ic growth, inflation, shifts in the income distribution
or any other economic factors not directly attribut-
able to policy actions were ignored when determin-
ing if the budget rules were satisfied.Thus, any cycli-
cal or trend movements in the deficit,revenues or ex-
penditures,except those associated with discretionary
spending, were left outside the process. Given that
discretionary spending by its nature involves little au-
tomatic response to the overall level of economic ac-
tivity,this change meant that the need under GRH to
offset automatic fiscal stabilizers was largely elimi-
nated.On the other hand,the lack of an overall deficit
target also meant that there was no “error-correc-
tion”mechanism to alter policy following an unstable
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fiscal trajectory.Different underlying growth rates of
taxes and spending,for example,faced no restrictions
under BEA.
The BEA also introduced the use of a multi-year bud-
get “window”,requiring initially that the PAYGO re-
quirement be satisfied over a five-year period,based
on CBO projections,rather than just for the immedi-
ate fiscal year in which legislation was enacted. The
aim was to incorporate the future effects of policy ac-
tions and to reduce the scope for using short-term
timing changes to meet a one-year deficit target, a
practice that had been encouraged by the structure of
GRH.The BEA originally applied through 1995,but
it was extended to 1998 and then to 2002 by legisla-
tion in 1993 and 1997, respectively, before officially
expiring in 2002.
For much of the period during which the BEA was in
force, the Senate followed additional rules with re-
spect to its own operations,including a longer horizon
(ten years) for the PAYGO rule and which made sub-
ject to a point of order (requiring a supermajority of
60 votes out of 100 to override) proposals that would
increase the deficit beyond the budget window. This
so-called “Byrd rule” became quite relevant in 2001,
when the tax cuts proposed by President George W.
Bush were adopted for only a ten-year period.
Because of the possibility that Republicans would be
unable to muster 60 votes to override the point of or-
der based on the Byrd rule,the tax cuts were enacted
to apply only during the budget window. Although
there have been subsequent modifications to some
provisions of the 2001 legislation,the law as of the be-
ginning of 2009 still specifies that marginal income tax
rates will rise in 2011 to their pre-2001 levels,and that
the federal estate tax,having been fully phased out in
2010, will reappear in 2011 in its pre-2001 form.This
case study provides compelling evidence of the impact
of budget rules on the shape of legislation, although
not necessarily on broader aggregates of spending,
revenues and deficits.
Though officially in place through 2002, BEA began
to erode after 1998,the fiscal year in which the United
States had its first budget surplus since the 1960s.At
first,the erosion took the form of procedures used to
get around the BEA’s restrictions, such as a large in-
crease in 1999 in “emergency”discretionary spending
that was not subject to the BEA caps on discretionary
spending (CBO 1999).Eventually,however,Congress
simply changed the budget rules as it went,adjusting
the discretionary spending caps to conform to actual
spending and setting aside the PAYGO rules on a
case-by-case basis. For example, Congress adopted
the large tax cut proposed by President George W.
Bush in 2001 without any offsetting revenue increas-
es or entitlement spending reductions, even though
these were required by BEA,which was still official-
ly in force.
In the years immediately after 2002,Congress acted es-
sentially without budget rules of the type embodied in
GRH or BEA,even though it continued to use the an-
nual budget plans the CBA requires to impose limits
on the budget effects of certain legislation, as in 2003,
when,in an episode discussed further below,a ten-year
budget cost of USD 350 billion was imposed before the
details of a tax cut were worked out.The 2007 change
in the control of Congress led to a renewal of interest
in budget rules, and more recent events, including
President Obama’s election and the severe recession
and ballooning budget deficit, have left the potential
future use of budget rules very much up in the air.
Can voluntary budget rules affect behavior?
The repeal of GRH in 1990 and the gradual collapse
of BEA after 1998 both illustrate a characteristic of
US federal budget rules: the rules cease to operate
once they deviate too far from consensus policy. In
1990, GRH called for deficit reduction far greater
than Congress wished to enact.After 1998,adherence
to BEA would have resulted in significant budget dis-
cipline at odds with the politics of the time,given that
the federal budget was in surplus and CBO was pro-
jecting even larger surpluses for the years to come.It
is not surprising that the rules failed, given that they
could be repealed by majority vote. The question is
whether they had any significant impact at all.
It is possible, however, that a change in the budget
process,even if adopted by simple majority,can change
budget outcomes by altering each legislator’s incen-
tives.For example,suppose that each legislator prefers
a low overall deficit to a higher one,but also wishes to
promote his or her own spending priorities. With no
budget rule in place, there may be no commitment
mechanism in place to facilitate co-operation on keep-
ing spending low.An overall spending limit could lead
to an equilibrium outcome with proportionately low-
er spending and a low deficit,an outcome that legisla-
tors would prefer to the high-deficit-high-spending
outcome with no budget rule. Thus, the outcome
achieved under a budget rule might be consistent withthe contemporaneous wishes of the majority, while at
the same time representing a different outcome than
would occur without the budget rule in place.
The impact of US budget rules
Even if voluntary budget rules can have an effect by
helping to sustain an equilibrium of fiscal responsi-
bility,identifying the impact of such rules is made dif-
ficult by the rules’ endogeneity. Changes in budget
rules may be induced by the same factors that affect
fiscal policy directly, so it is difficult to estimate the
independent impact of the rules themselves without
some independent source of variation in the rules,for
which obvious candidates are lacking. With this ob-
stacle in mind,my research has focused on more sub-
tle types of behavioral responses,looking not at how
overall deficits,revenues,and spending behaved dur-
ing different budget regimes, but rather on the be-
havior of different components of revenues and
spending, and on the responses of fiscal policy to
macroeconomic and fiscal conditions.The argument
is that the different budget rules should have pre-
dictable effects on these elements of behavior that
simple changes in the degree of fiscal responsibility
would not be expected to have.Put another way,there
are a variety of coincidental effects of budget rules
that one may view as exogenous, since they are dis-
tinct from the overall objectives of fiscal discipline.
As reviewed above,one can distinguish five periods:
(1) the pre-CBA era, when no explicit budget rules
applied; (2) the CBA period, from the 1974 CBA
adoption until the 1985 passage of the first GRH
Act, with co-ordinated budget policy but no exoge-
nous restrictions on spending or taxes;(3) the GRH
period, from late 1985 until the late-1990 adoption
of the BEA, during which explicit one-year deficit
targets were specified; (4) the BEA period, from
adoption of BEA until its effective demise around
1999, during which discretionary spending caps and
PAYGO rules for taxes and entitlement spending
were in force; and (5) the post-BEA period from
1999 until recently, during which limited budget
rules applied.
Non-defense discretionary spending
Non-defense discretionary spending is perhaps the
most susceptible to budget restrictions, given that
entitlement spending is not directly driven by an-
nual appropriations,and defense spending depends
very strongly on factors external to the budget
process. Moreover, discretionary spending has fig-
ured differently in the various budget regimes iden-
tified. Absent any explicit budget rules, we might
expect discretionary spending to increase with the
health of the budget, as measured by the most re-
cent budget surplus, if the surplus provides a signal
of the resources available to the government. We
might also expect discretionary spending to in-
crease with the size of the output gap between po-
tential and actual GDP,reflecting Keynesian objec-
tives to stimulate the economy during periods of
slow growth.
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Table 1 
Determinants of non-defense discretionary spending changes, 1963-2006
Dependent variable: Annual change in spending relative to potential GDP
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Sample period 
Independent










Constant 0.0011 0.0036  –0.0002 0.0052  –0.0012 0.0010 
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0033) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0003)
Budget surplus (–1) 0.0525 0.1783  –0.0199 0.1605  –0.0042 0.0684 
(0.0215) (0.0398) (0.1431) (0.0232) (0.1228) (0.0275)
GDP Gap (–1) 0.0278 0.0668  –0.0250 0.0203 0.0597 0.0748 
(0.0171) (0.0165) (0.0829) (0.0256) (0.1773) (0.0340)
R
2 0.084 0.719  -0.229 0.953 0.155 0.377 
Number of
observations 44  12  11 4 7 8 
Data Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Source: Auerbach (2008).CESifo DICE Report 1/2009 45
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Table 1 provides estimates, based on annual fiscal
year data,3 of the impact of the prior year’s budget
surplus and output gap on the change in non-defense
discretionary spending from the previous year, with
all series scaled by potential GDP.The first column of
the Table presents estimates for the full sample peri-
od,for which the expected relationship holds weakly.
The relationship is much stronger for the period pri-
or to the Congressional Budget Act, as illustrated in
the next column of Table 1, and then disappears en-
tirely during the CBA period. During the very short
GRH period,4 the very strong relationship of spend-
ing to the budget surplus reappears,but the response
to the GDP gap does not.Although so short a sam-
ple period makes any conclusions tentative, both of
these results are quite consistent with what one would
expect,given the way that the GRH rules worked.As
each year’s budget surplus was required to hit a pre-
specified target,any improvement in the condition of
the budget made more resources available for spend-
ing increases or tax cuts. But an increase in the out-
put gap had no such effect,because the deficit targets
were not cyclically adjusted.
The behavior of discretionary spending under BEA
was similar to that under CBA,not responsive to the
budget surplus and not significantly responsive to the
GDP gap.With discretionary spending caps in place,
spending could only respond to the economy or to the
budget if the caps themselves could respond,or if ex-
ceptions (such as emergency spending) could be
arranged.The estimates suggest that neither of these
channels was significant during the period, even
though the caps were revised in 1993 and 1997 when
the provisions of BEA were extended to later years.
In the most recent period, after the effective demise
of BEA,discretionary spending has reverted to a pat-
tern of significant responses to both the budget sur-
plus and the GDP gap.The response to the surplus is
weaker than under GRH,but this makes sense,given
that there is no explicit deficit target.
These results are consistent with budget rules having
had some impact on non-defense discretionary
spending. Except perhaps for the lack of responsive-
ness during the CBA period, the patterns are consis-
tent with the restrictions imposed during the differ-
ent budget periods, and so represent a more subtle
form of evidence than that based on levels or the
composition of spending,which might more easily be
explained by alternative hypotheses.
Legislated changes in spending and revenue
Some elements of budget rules have involved levels of
the deficit or its components.For example,GRH had
deficit targets and BEA had caps on discretionary
spending. But BEA also placed limits on legislated
changes in spending and revenues, under its PAYGO
rules.Thus, we should observe changes in patterns of
these legislated changes if BEA had an impact. To
construct measures of legislated changes in revenue
and expenditure, I utilize data and procedures devel-
oped in earlier papers, including Auerbach (2008).
CBO typically publishes two major revisions in its pro-
jections of revenue and spending each year, in late
January or early February, and in August or Sep-
tember.Each revision indicates the changes from the
previous forecast and divides these changes into com-
ponents due to legislation and to other factors.
By accumulating changes attributed to legislative ac-
tion between each of these forecasts, I derive continu-
ous,roughly semiannual series of forecast revenue and
spending policy changes. For each observation, I mea-
sure the policy change with respect to revenue and non-
interest spending. As each update includes legislative
changes for the current fiscal year and several subse-
quent years, these must be combined in some manner
to provide a measure of the legislation’s overall effect.
I form the discounted sum of changes adopted during
the interval for the current and subsequent four fiscal
years (relative to each year’s corresponding measure of
potential GDP), with the five weights normalized to
sum to 1 and a discount factor of 0.5.5 Just as current
policy changes have effects in future fiscal years,policy
may respond to anticipated future fiscal conditions as
well.Thus, as an alternative to the most recent budget
surplus,I have found that a better fit results if one uses
a measure based on the budget surpluses projected
over the budget period,which are included in the CBO
projections.To be consistent with the aggregate policy
measure just developed,I aggregate the projected sur-
plus for the current and next four fiscal years,as of the
beginning of the period of observation,using the same
discount factor as in the policy measure.
3 All annual data are from the CBO.
4 I exclude the fiscal year during which GRH was adopted (1986),
as adoption was accompanied by a large spending cut that is diffi-
cult to attribute to the budget rule. I follow the same procedure
below in excluding the fiscal year of the adoption of BEA (1991),
which came out of a budget summit that also produced spending
cuts and tax increases.
5That is,each successive future observation receives half the weight
of the observation one period earlier.This discount factor was cho-
sen in my earlier work based on goodness of fit.Table 2 presents results based on these constructed
measures, starting with those for the full period, be-
ginning with the observation for change in projections
from winter to summer 1984,labeled 1984:2,and end-
ing with the changes in August,2007.The explanatory
variables are the beginning of period weighted pro-
jected surplus and the estimated GDP gap in the most
recent quarter before the policy change being ex-
plained. The first column in Table 2 presents results
with revenue as the dependent variable; the second
column has the same specification but with non-inter-
est spending as the dependent variable.Both columns
show significant policy responses to both the budget
surplus and the output gap, in the anticipated direc-
tions, with deficit-increasing policies resulting from
higher projected surpluses or a higher output gap.
Data availability permits us to consider the perfor-
mance of these equations for the three most recent
budget regimes, GRH, BEA and post-BEA.The re-
sults for each of these regimes are presented in the
remaining columns in Table 2.6 For GRH,none of the
coefficients are significant,but it is interesting to note
that the coefficients on the GDP gap actually have
the wrong sign,and do so only during this period.7As
discussed above in relation to a similar finding for dis-
cretionary spending,with deficit targets not adjusted
for the level of economic activity,there is no scope for
countercyclical policy. Indeed, given that automatic
stabilizers cause revenue to fall as output falls,the on-
ly way to keep the deficit from actually rising is to
pass legislation to increase taxes or reduce spending
as output falls – precisely the pro-cyclical legislative
policy reactions estimated here.
Under the BEA regime,for which these particular da-
ta on legislative changes are perhaps the most rele-
vant, significant impacts for both output and surplus
variables are restored on both the revenue side and
the spending side. This result appears at first to be
somewhat puzzling.After all,if the PAYGO rules are
in place, then how can changes in the projected bud-
get surplus or the output gap have any net impact on
legislated changes in the deficit? A potential answer
to this puzzle is that the PAYGO restrictions did not
apply directly to the revenue and spending variables
being measured here.8 First, the restrictions applied
to legislation enacted in any given fiscal year,where-
as the variables measured here are semiannual.
Second, the PAYGO rules did not apply to the
weighted sum of five years’ revenue or spending
changes but to unweighted sums over periods of dif-
ferent length.Thus,legislation was only partially re-
stricted, so we might expect the overall response
based on the five-year weighted average to be small-
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Table 2 
Determinants of policy changes, 1984-2007 
Dependent variable: Semiannual policy change in revenue or non-interest spending relative to potential GDP
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Sample period and dependent variable




Revenue Spending Revenue Spending Revenue Spending Revenue Spending
–0.0012 0.0021 –0.0002 0.0025 –0.0010 0.0006 –0.0014 0.0022 Constant
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0034) (0.0067) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007)
–0.0700 0.1198 0.0659 –0.0219 –0.0860 0.0501 –0.1028 0.1449 GDP gap (–1)
(0.0210) (0.0308) (0.0755) (0.1502) (0.0504) (0.0381) (0.0463) (0.0650)
–0.0714 0.1125 –0.0297 0.1126 –0.0802 0.0384 –0.0857 0.1193 Projected
surplus (0.0154) (0.0225) (0.1142) (0.2272) (0.0412) (0.0311) (0.0407) (0.0571)
R
2 0.298 0.335 0.242 -0.073 0.111 -0.018 0.164 0.164
Number of
observations
47 47 9 9 16 16 17 17
Data Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Source: Auerbach (2008).
6 As before, I leave out the observations including the adoption of
GRH (1986:1) and BEA (1991:1) to avoid attributing concurrent
policy changes to the rules just being adopted.
7 The results for GRH are similar when the lagged budget surplus,
an arguably more relevant measure for this budget regime, is sub-
stituted in the equation for the weighted projected surplus. 8 See Auerbach (2008) for further discussion.CESifo DICE Report 1/2009 47
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er than with no restrictions but not zero.The last two
columns of the Table are consistent with this con-
clusion, showing that all four policy responses
strengthened after the demise of BEA.In summary,
the strength and signs of legislative policy respons-
es under different budget regimes are consistent
with how the budget rules in each regime worked:
pro-cyclical policy responses under GRH, full poli-
cy responses after BEA and muted policy respons-
es under BEA.
Further effects on legislative behavior
The post-BEA period offers additional lessons con-
cerning the effects of budget rule design. In partic-
ular, the long budget window used by the Senate
during its post-BEA deliberations appears to have
had an impact on the pattern of tax legislation,mak-
ing so-called “sunset” provisions more common in
tax legislation. Even though the PAYGO rule was
no longer in force at the time, deliberations leading
up to the 2003 tax cut included negotiations over the
size of the tax cut and its components.An agreement
was reached by the (Republican) leaders to limit the
tax cut to a total revenue cost of USD 350 billion
over the ten-year budget window, the total revenue
cost being calculated using a simple sum over the ten
years.This calculation method meant that there was
a trade-off under the cap between the annual cost of
the tax cut and the number of years over which the
tax cut applied: a temporary tax cut could have a
larger annual cost. Also, with no discounting of fu-
ture revenue costs,tax cuts that applied only during
the early years of the ten-year period were larger
relative to the size of the economy than those that
applied only later in the ten-year period. This lack
of discounting, along with the greater uncertainty
that future tax cuts could be sustained, made tem-
porary tax cuts that applied early in the budget win-
dow more attractive to tax-cut proponents than tax
cuts that were to be phased in only toward the end
of the budget window.The 2003 outcome was a tem-
porary tax cut expiring before the end of the budget
window, illustrating that even weak budget proce-
dures can affect the shape of legislation. One sees a
similar impact looking at the GRH period:when on-
ly the immediate fiscal year was relevant to budget
rules, deficit-reducing measures tended to be con-
centrated in that year (Auerbach 2008).
The objective in 2003 was to limit the size of the tax
cut, not to encourage temporary policies. Likewise,
the designers of GRH were interested in more than
temporary deficit reduction. In each instance, a mul-
ti-year budget window with discounting of future rev-
enue costs might have led to a more rational outcome;
it would have provided some credit for future years’
deficit reduction under GRH, and would have re-
duced the cost of future tax cuts under the budget cap
in 2003. Indeed, such a window is what is suggested
by a model in which competing parties run deficits
when in power to commit resources to their preferred
objectives (Auerbach 2006),although the ideal para-
meters of such a mechanism would depend on a num-
ber of factors,such as the stability of government and
the rigidity of existing policies.
What should budget rules accomplish?
It is difficult to determine the effects that US budget
rules have had on aggregate spending, revenues, or
deficits because of the endogeneity of the budget
rules themselves as well as the many other political
changes that occurred contemporaneously. The pre-
vious discussion does suggest,however,that the rules
have exerted influences on fiscal behavior in ways
consistent with what one would predict.In some cas-
es, though, as with induced pro-cyclical policy under
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings or the 2003 sunset provi-
sions, there were some clear negative side-effects.
These negative effects highlight that achievement of
the underlying objectives of budget rules requires not
only that the rules matter, but also that the rules are
aligned with these underlying objectives.
Budget rules presumably are meant to relate to the
growth of government and to the tendency to shift fi-
nancial responsibilities to future generations. But
none of the US budget rules studied here incorporates
the implicit liabilities associated with the long-term
commitments of entitlement programs. As a conse-
quence,the entire period witnessed large increases in
future implicit liabilities that had only limited impacts
on short-term budget measures. Further, none of the
measures have successfully solved the problem of how
to incorporate a commitment to fiscal discipline with
the need to maintain short-run flexibility to deal with
macroeconomic conditions, a challenge that has
dogged the SGP.9 Both of these drawbacks of past
budget regimes are now in the spotlight as the US fis-
cal policy confronts a recession and a long-run fiscal
imbalance, each of great severity.
9 In Auerbach (2006) I consider how this problem might be
attacked in the context of a multi-year budget window by imposing
shadow prices rather than absolute restrictions on annual deficits.References
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